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Some Skepticism
About Search Neutrality
By James Grimmelmann*
The perfect search engine would be like the mind of God.1
The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or
some loathsome insect, over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully
provoked; his wrath towards you burns like fire; he looks upon you as
worthy of nothing else, but to be cast into the fire …2
If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him.3
Search engines are attention lenses; they bring the online world into focus.
They can redirect, reveal, magnify, and distort. They have immense power to
help and to hide. We use them, to some extent, always at our own peril. And
out of the many ways that search engines can cause harm, the thorniest
problems of all stem from their ranking decisions.4
What makes ranking so problematic? Consider an example. The U.K.
technology company Foundem offers “vertical search”5—it helps users
compare prices for electronics, books, and other goods. That makes it a Google
competitor.6 But in June 2006, Google applied a “penalty” to Foundem’s
*

Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. I would like to thank Aislinn Black and
Frank Pasquale for their comments. This essay is available for reuse under the Creative
Commons Attribution 3.0 United States license,
http://creativecommons.org/`licenses/by/3.0/us/.

1

Charles Ferguson, What’s Next for Google, TECH. REV., Jan. 1, 2005, at 38, available at
http://www.technologyreview.com/web/14065/ (quoting Sergey Brin, co-founder of
Google).

2

Jonathan Edwards, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God (sermon delivered July 8, 1741 in
Enfield, Connecticut), available in 22 WORKS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS 411 (Harry S. Stout &
Nathan O. Hatch eds., Yale University Press 2003).

3

Voltaire, Epître à l’auteur du livre des Trois imposteurs [Letter to the Author of The Three
Impostors] (1768), available at http://www.whitman.edu/VSA/trois.imposteurs.html.

4

See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17–44 (2007)
(identifying nine distinct types of harm search engines can cause to users, information
providers, and third parties).

5

See generally JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE
RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 274–76 (2005) (discussing “domainspecific search”).

6

See Google Product Search Beta, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/prdhp.
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website, causing all of its pages to drop dramatically in Google’s rankings.7 It
took more than three years for Google to remove the penalty and restore
Foundem to the first few pages of results for searches like “compare prices
shoei xr-1000.”8 Foundem’s traffic, and hence its business, dropped off
dramatically as a result. The experience led Foundem’s co-founder, Adam Raff,
to become an outspoken advocate: creating the site searchneutrality.org,9 filing
comments with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),10 and taking
his story to the op-ed pages of The New York Times,11 calling for legal protection
for the Foundems of the world.
Of course, the government doesn’t get involved every time a business is harmed
by a bad ranking—or Consumer Reports would be out of business.12 Instead,
search-engine critics base their case for regulation on the immense power of
search engines, which can “break the business of a Web site that is pushed
down the rankings.”13 They have the power to shape what millions of users,
carrying out billions of searches a day, see.14 At that scale, search engines are
the new mass media15—or perhaps the new meta media—capable of shaping
public discourse itself. And while power itself may not be an evil, abuse of
power is.
Search-engine critics thus aim to keep search engines—although in the U.S. and
much of the English-speaking world, it might be more accurate to say simply
“Google”16—from abusing their dominant position. The hard part comes in
defining “abuse.” After a decade of various attempts, critics have hit on the
7

See Foundem’s Google Story, SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.searchneutrality.org/foundem-google-story.

8

The Shoei XR-1000 is a motorcycle helmet—according to Foundem, it’s £149.99 plus £10
delivery from Helmet City.

9

About, SEARCH NEUTRALITY.ORG, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.searchneutrality.org/about.

10

Reply Comments of Foundem, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband
Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 (F..C.C).

11

Adam Raff, Search, But You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at A27.

12

Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (holding Consumer Reports not
subject to product disparagement liability for negative review of Bose speaker).

13

The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at A30.

14

See GRANT ESKELSEN ET AL, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY FACT BOOK 12–13 (10th ed. 2009),
http://pff.org/issues-pubs/books/factbook_10th_Ed.pdf.

15

See generally KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT (2009)
(trying to understand Google by adopting the perspective of the media industry). Cf. Aaron
Swartz, Googling for Sociopaths, RAW THOUGHT (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/googled (describing Googled as “a history of [Google]
as told by the incumbent sociopaths”).

16

See ESKELSEN ET AL., FACT BOOK, supra note 14.

THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET

437

idea of “neutrality” as a governing principle. The idea is explicitly modeled on
network neutrality, which would “forbid operators of broadband networks to
discriminate against third-party applications, content or portals.”17 Like
broadband Internet service providers (ISPs), search engines “accumulate great
power over the structure of online life.”18 Thus, perhaps search engines should
similarly be required not to discriminate among websites.
For some academics, this idea is a thought experiment: a way to explore the
implications of network neutrality ideas.19 For others, it is a real proposal: a
preliminary agenda for action.20 Lawyers for ISPs fighting back against network
neutrality have seized on it, either as a reductio ad absurdum or a way to kneecap
their bitter rival Google.21 Even the New York Times has gotten into the game,
running an editorial calling for scrutiny of Google’s “editorial policy.”22 Since
New York Times editorials, as a rule, reflect no independent thought but only a
kind of prevailing conventional wisdom, it is clear that search neutrality has
truly arrived on the policy scene.
Notwithstanding its sudden popularity, the case for search neutrality is a
muddle. There is a fundamental misfit between its avowed policy goal of
protecting users and most of the tests it proposes to protect them. Scratch
beneath the surface of search neutrality and you will find that it would protect
17

Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 333 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=812991.

18

Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carries and Search
Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL. FORUM 263, 298, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134159 [hereinafter Pasquale,
Internet Nondiscrimination Principles].

19

See Mark R. Patterson, Non-Network Barriers to Network Neutrality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2843
(2010); Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the Never-ending Conflict
Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets, 8 REV. NETWORK ECON. 40 (2009).

20

See DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE
INTERNET AGE (2009) [hereinafter NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM]; Pasquale, Internet
Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 18; Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search
Commission: Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Speech, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149
(2008) [hereinafter Bracha & Pasquale, Federal Search Commission]; Jennifer A. Chandler, A
Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1095 (2007).

21

Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Senior Vice President, AT&T, to Sharon Gillett, Chief,
Wireline Competition Bureau Federal Communications Commission (Sept. 25, 2009),
available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/technology/20090925_ATTLetter.pdf.

22

The Google Algorithm, supra note 13. But see Danny Sullivan, The New York Times Algorithm &
Why It Needs Government Regulation, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (July 15, 2010) (parodying New
York Times editorial on Google).
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not search users, but websites. In the search space, however, websites are as
often users’ enemies as not; the whole point of search is to help users avoid the
sites they don’t want to see.
In short, search neutrality’s ends and means don’t match. To explain why, I will
deconstruct eight proposed search-neutrality principles:
1. Equality: Search engines shouldn’t differentiate at all among websites.
2. Objectivity: There are correct search results and incorrect ones, so search
engines should return only the correct ones.
3. Bias: Search engines should not distort the information landscape.
4. Traffic: Websites that depend on a flow of visitors shouldn’t be cut off
by search engines.
5. Relevance: Search engines should maximize users’ satisfaction with
search results.
6. Self-interest: Search engines shouldn’t trade on their own account.
7. Transparency: Search engines should disclose the algorithms they use to
rank web pages.
8. Manipulation: Search engines should rank sites only according to general
rules, rather than promoting and demoting sites on an individual basis.
As we shall see, all eight of these principles are unusable as bases for sound
search regulation.
I would like to be clear up front about the limits of my argument. Just because
search neutrality is incoherent, it doesn’t follow that search engines deserve a
free pass under antitrust, intellectual property, privacy, or other well-established
bodies of law.23 Nor is search-specific legal oversight out of the question.
Search engines are capable of doing dastardly things: According to
BusinessWeek, the Chinese search engine Baidu explicitly shakes down
websites, demoting them in its rankings unless they buy ads.24 It’s easy to tell
horror stories about what search engines might do that are just plausible enough
to be genuinely scary.25 My argument is just that search neutrality, as currently
proposed, is unlikely to be workable and quite likely to make things worse. It
fails at its own goals, on its own definition of the problem.
23

This essay is not the place for a full discussion of these issues (although we will meet
antitrust and consumer protection law in passing). Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search
Engine Law, supra note 4, provides a more detailed map.

24

Chi-Chu Tschang, The Squeeze at China’s Baidu, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_02/b4115021710265.htm
(alleging that Baidu directly retaliates against sites that refuse to buy sponsored links by
demoting them in its organic rankings).

25

See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Scroogled, http://craphound.com/scroogled.html; Tom Slee, Mr.
Google’s Guidebook, WHIMSLEY (Mar. 7, 2008),
http://whimsley.typepad.com/whimsley/2008/03/mr-googles-guid.html.

THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET

439

Theory
Before delving into the specifics of search-neutrality proposals, it will help to
understand the principles said to justify them. There are two broad types of
arguments made to support search neutrality, one each focusing on users and
on websites. A search engine that misuses its ranking power might be seen
either as misleading users about what’s available online, or as blocking websites
from reaching users.26 Consider the arguments in turn.
Users: Search helps people find the things they want and need. Good search
results are better for them. And since search is both subjective and personal,
users themselves are the ones who should define what makes search results
good. The usual term for this goal is “relevance”: relevant results are the ones
that users themselves are most satisfied with.27 All else being equal, good search
policy should try to maximize relevance.
A libertarian might say that this goal is trivial.28 Users are free to pick and
choose among search engines and other informational tools.29 They will
naturally flock to the search engine that offers them the most relevant results;
the market will provide just as much relevance as it is efficient to provide.30
There is no need for regulation; relevance, being demanded by users, will be

26

Other arguments for search neutrality reduce to these two. Bracha and Pasquale, for
example, are concerned about democracy. They want “an open and relatively equal chance
to all members of society for participation in the cultural sphere.” Bracha & Pasquale, Federal
Search Commission, supra note 20, at 1183–84. Search engines provide that chance if
individuals can both find (as users) and be found (as websites) when they participate in
politics and culture. Similarly, Bracha and Pasquale’s economic efficiency argument turns on
users’ ability to find market information, id. at 1173–75. and their fairness concern speaks to
websites’ losses of “audience or business,” id. at 1175–76. Whatever interest society has in
search neutrality arises from users’ and websites’ interests in it—so we are justified in
focusing our attention on users and websites.

27

See BATTELLE, THE SEARCH, supra note 5, at 19–25.

28

For a clear statement of a libertarian perspective on search neutrality, see Mike Masnick’s
posts at Techdirt on the subject, collected at
http:/www.techdirt.com/blog.php?tag=search+neutrality. Eric Goldman’s Search
Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 188 (2006), makes a
general case against the regulation of relevance on similar grounds.

29

In Google’s words, “Competition is just one click away.” Adam Kovacevich, Google’s
Approach to Competition, GOOGLE POLICY BLOG (May 8, 2009),
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/05/googles-approach-tocompetition.html.

30

See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151.
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supplied by search engines. And this is exactly what search engines themselves
say: relevance is their principal, or only, goal.31
The response to this point of view—most carefully argued by Frank
Pasquale32—is best described as “liberal.” It focuses on maximizing the
effective autonomy of search users, but questions whether market forces
actually enable users to demand optimal relevance. For one thing, it questions
whether users can actually detect deviations from relevance.33 The user who
turns to a search engine, by definition, doesn’t yet know what she’s looking for
or where it is. Her own knowledge, therefore, doesn’t provide a fully reliable
check on what the search engine shows her. The information she would need
to know that the search engine is hiding something from her may be precisely
the information it’s hiding from her—a relevant site that she didn’t know
existed.34
Perhaps just as importantly, structural features of the search market can make it
hard for users to discipline search engines by switching. Search-neutrality
advocates have argued that search exhibits substantial barriers to entry.35 The
web is so big, and search algorithms so complex and refined, that there are
substantial fixed costs to competing at all.36 Moreover, the rise of personalized
search both creates switching costs for individual users37 and also makes it
harder for them to share information about their experiences with multiple
search engines.38
Websites: The case for protecting websites reaches back into free speech theory.
Jerome Barron’s 1967 article, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right,39
31

See, e.g., Technology Overview, GOOGLE, www.google.com/corporate/tech.html; How Web
Documents Are Ranked, YAHOO!,
http://help.yahoo.com/l/us/yahoo/search/indexing/ranking-01.html; Ask Search
Technology, ASK, http://sp.ask.com/en/docs/about/ask_technology.shtml.

32

See Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 18; Bracha & Pasquale, Federal
Search Commission, supra note 20; Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on
Search Results, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 61 (2008); Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and
Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115 (2006).

33

See Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20, at 1116; Patterson, Non-Network
Barriers, supra note 19, at 2860-62.

34

See Bracha & Pasquale, Federal Search Commission, supra note 20, at 1183–84.

35

See id. at 1181–82.

36

See id. at 1181.

37

See Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 18, at 265.

38

See Frank Pasquale, Could Personalized Search Ruin Your Life?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 7,
2008),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/02/personalized_se.html.

39

80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
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argued that freedom of speech is an empty right in a mass-media society unless
one also has access to the mass media themselves. He thus argued that
newspapers should be required to open their letters to the editor and their
advertising to all points of view.40 Although his proposed right of access is
basically a dead letter as far as First Amendment doctrine goes,41 it captured the
imaginations of media-law scholars and media advocates.42
Scholars have begun to adapt Barron’s ideas to online intermediaries, including
search engines. Dawn Nunziato’s book Virtual Freedom draws extensively on
Barron to argue that Congress may need to “authorize the regulation of
dominant search engines to require that they provide meaningful access to
content.”43 Jennifer Chandler applies Barron’s ideas to propose a “right to
reach an audience”44 that would give website owners various protections against
exclusion45 and demotion by search engines.46 Similarly, Frank Pasquale
suggests bringing “universal service” over into the search space,47 perhaps
through a government-provided search engine.48
The Barronian argument for access, however, needs to be qualified. The freespeech interest in access to search engine ranking placement is really audiences’
free speech interest; the real harm is that search users have been deprived of
access to the speech of websites, not that websites have been deprived of access
to users. Put another way, websites’ access interest is derivative of users’
interests. In the Supreme Court’s words, “The First Amendment protects the
right of every citizen to ‘reach the minds of willing listeners.’”49 Or, in Jerome
40

Id. at 1667.

41

See Miami Herald Pub’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down Florida law
requiring newspapers to provide equal space for political responses).

42

See, e.g., Reclaiming the First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of Media Reform, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 917–1582 (symposium issue collecting papers from conference honoring the 40th
anniversary of publication of Access to the Press).

43

NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, at 150.

44

Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20, at 1103–17 (search engines), 1124-30
(proposed right).

45

Exclusion from a search index may sound like a bright-line category of abuse, but note that
a demotion from, say, #1 to #58,610 will have the same effect. No one ever clicks through
5861 pages of results. Thus, in practice, any rule against exclusion would also need to come
with a—more problematic—rule against substantial demotions.

46

Id. at 1117–18.

47

Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 18, at 289–92. His example, which
focuses on Google’s scans of books for its Book Search project, is interesting, but is
“universal access” only in a loose, metaphorical sense.

48

See Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural and Political Facility, infra 258.

49

Hefron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (quoting
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)) (emphasis added).
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Barron’s, “[T]he point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers but
the minds of the hearers.”50 With these purposes in mind, let us turn to actual
search-neutrality proposals.

Equality
Scott Cleland observes that Google’s “algorithm reportedly has over 1,000
variables/discrimination biases which decide which content gets surfaced.”51
He concludes that “Google is not neutral” and thus should be subject to any
FCC network-neutrality regulation.52 On this view, a search engine does
something wrong if it treats websites differently, “surfac[ing]” some, rather than
others. This is a theory of neutrality as equality, it comes from the networkneutrality debates, and it is nonsensical as applied to search.
Equality has a long pedigree in telecommunications. For years, common-carrier
regulations required the AT&T system to offer its services on equal terms to
anyone who wanted a phone.53 This kind of equality is at the heart of proposed
network neutrality regulations: treating all packets identically once they arrive at
an ISP’s router, regardless of source or contents.54 Whether or not equality in
packet routing is a good idea as a technical matter, the rule itself is simple
enough and relatively clear. One can, without difficulty, identify Comcast’s
forging of packets to terminate BitTorrent connections as a violation of the
principle.55 As long as an ISP isn’t overloaded to the point of losing too many
packets, equality does what it’s supposed to: ensures that every website enjoys
access to the ISP’s network and customers.
Try to apply this form of equality to search and the results are absurd. Of
course Google differentiates among sites—that’s why we use it. Systematically
favoring certain types of content over others isn’t a defect for a search engine—
it’s the point.56 If I search for “Machu Picchu pictures,” I want to see llamas in a
50

Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 39, at 1653.

51

Scott Cleland, Why Google Is Not Neutral, PRECURSOR BLOG (Nov. 4, 2009),
http://precursorblog.com/content/why-google-is-not-neutral.

52

Id.

53

See generally JONATHAN E. NEUCHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS 45–68
(2005).

54

For an accessible introduction to the technical issues, see Edward W. Felten, The Nuts and
Bolts of Network Neutrality (2006), http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf.

55

See In re Formal Compl. of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading
Peer-to-Peer Applications, WC Docket No. 07-52, Order, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13,028, 13,029–32
(discussing blocking), 13,050–58 (finding that blocking violated federal policy) (2008), vacated,
Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

56

See Karl Bode, Google Might Stop Violating “Search Neutrality”If Anybody Knew What That
Actually Meant, TECHDIRT (May 7, 2010),
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ruined city on a cloud-forest mountaintop, not horny housewives who whiten
your teeth while you wait for them to refinance your mortgage. Search
inevitably requires some form of editorial control.57 A search engine cannot
possibly treat all websites equally, not without turning into the phone book. But
for that matter, even the phone book is not neutral in the sense of giving fully
equal access to all comers, as the proliferation of AAA Locksmiths and Aabco
Plumbers attests. Differentiating among websites, without something more, is
not wrongful.

Objectivity
If search engines must make distinctions, perhaps we should insist that they
make correct distinctions. Foundem, for example, argues that the Google
penalty was unfair by pointing to positive write-ups of Foundem from “the
UK’s leading technology television programme” and “the UK’s leading
consumer body,” and to its high search ranks on Yahoo! and Bing.58 The
unvoiced assumption here is that search queries can have objectively right and
wrong answers. A search on “James Grimmelmann blog” should come back
with my weblog at http://laboratorium.net; anything else is a wrong answer.
But this view of what search is and does is wrong. A search for “apple” could
be looking for information about Fiji apples, Apple computers, or Fiona Apple.
“bbs” could refer to airgun pellets, bulletin-board systems, or bed-andbreakfasts. Different people will have different intentions in mind; even the
same person will have different intentions at different times. Sergey Brin’s
theological comparison of perfect search to the “mind of God”59 shows us why
perfect search is impossible. Not even Google is—or ever could be—
omniscient. The search query itself is necessarily an incomplete basis on which
to guess at possible results.60
The objective view of search, then, fails for two related reasons. First, search
users are profoundly diverse. They have highly personal, highly contextual
goals. One size cannot fit all. And second, a search engine’s job always
involves guesswork.61 Some guesses are better than others, but the search
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100504/1324279300.shtml (“[T]he entire purpose
of search is to discriminate and point the user toward more pertinent results.”).
57

See Goldman, Search Engine Bias, supra note 28, at 115–18.

58

Foundem’s Google Story, supra note 7.

59

Supra note 1.

60

See generally ALEX HALAVAIS, THE SEARCH-ENGINE SOCIETY 32–55 (2009) (discussing
difficulties of ascertaining meaning in search process).

61

See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 521–28
(2005).
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engine will always have to guess. “James Grimmelmann blog” shouldn’t take
users to Toyota’s corporate page—but perhaps they were interested in my
guest-blogging at Concurring Opinions, or in blogs about me, or they have me
mixed up with Eric Goldman and were actually looking for his blog. Time
Warner Cable’s complaint that “significant components of [Google’s] Ad Rank
scheme are subjective”62 is beside the point. Search itself is subjective.63
Few scholars go so far as to advocate explicit re-ranking to correct search
results.64 But even those who acknowledge that search is subjective sometimes
write as though it were not. Frank Pasquale gives a hypothetical in which
“YouTube’s results always appear as the first thirty [Google] results in response
to certain video queries for which [a rival video site] has demonstrably more
relevant content.”65 One might ask, “demonstrably more relevant” by what
standard? Often the answer will be contentious.
In Foundem’s case, what difference should it make that Yahoo! and others liked
Foundem? So? That’s their opinion. Google had a different one. Who is to
say that Yahoo! was right and Google was wrong?66 One could equally well
argue that Google’s low ranking was correct and Yahoo!’s high ranking was the
mistake. “compare prices shoei xr-1000” is not the sort of question that admits
62

Comments of Time Warner Cable Inc. 77, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet
Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 (F.C.C. comments filed Jan. 14,
2010).

63

See Goldman, Search Engine Bias, supra note 28, at 112–13. This point should not be
confused with a considered opinion on the question of how the First Amendment applies to
search-ranking decisions. Search engines make editorial judgments about relevance, but they
also present information that can only be described as factual (such as maps and addresses),
extol their objectivity in marketing statements, and are perceived by users as having an aura
of reliability. It is possible to make false statements even when speaking subjectively—for
example, I would be lying to you if I said that I enjoy eating scallops. The fact that search
engines’ judgments are expressed algorithmically, including in ways not contemplated by
their programmers, complicates the analysis even further. The definitive First Amendment
analysis of search-engine speech has yet to be written. Academic contributions to that
conversation include Goldman, Search Engine Bias, supra note 28, at 112–15; Bracha &
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission, supra note 20, at 1188–1201; Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited,
supra note 32, at 68–85; NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, passim (and
particularly pages 149–51); Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20, at 1124–29;
James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, 53 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 939, 946 (2009);
Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, supra note 4, at 58–60. Some leading cases
are listed in note 85, infra.

64

But see Sandeep Pandey et al., Shuffling a Stacked Deck: The Case for Partially Randomized Search
Results, PROC. 31ST VERY LARGE DATABASES CONF. 781 (2005) (arguing for randomization in
search results to promote obscure websites).
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of a right answer. This is why it doesn’t help to say that the Foundem vote is
four-to-one against Google. If deviation from the majority opinion makes a
search engine wrong, then so much for search engine innovation—and so much
for unpopular views.67

Bias
Ironically, it is the goal of protecting unpopular views that drives the concern
with search engine “bias.” Lucas Introna and Helen Nissenbaum, for example,
are concerned that search engines will direct users to sites that are already
popular and away from obscure sites.68 Alex Halavais calls for “resistance to
the homogenizing process of major search engines,”69 including governmental
interventions.70 These are structural concerns with popularity-based search.
Others worry about more particular biases. AT&T complains that “Google’s
algorithms unquestionably do favor some companies or sites.”71 Scott Cleland
objects that Google demotes content from other countries in its countryspecific search pages.72
The point that a technological system can display bias is one of those profound
observations that is at once both startling and obvious.73 It naturally leads to
the question of whether, when, and how one could correct for the bias search
engines introduce.74 But to pull that off, one must have a working
understanding of what constitutes search-engine bias. Batya Friedman and
Helen Nissenbaum define a computer system to be “biased” if it “systematically
and unfairly discriminates against certain individuals or groups of individuals in
favor of others.”75 Since search engines systematically discriminate by design,
67

This last point should be especially troubling to Barron-inspired advocates of “access,” since
the point of such a regime is to promote opinions that are not widely shared.
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Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines
Matters, 16 INFO. SOC. 169, 175 (2000).
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HALAVAIS, SEARCH ENGINE SOCIETY, supra note 60, at 106.
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Id. at 132–38.
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Comments of AT&T Inc. 102, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband
Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 (F.C.C. comments filed Jan. 14, 2010).
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Cleland, Why Google Is Not Neutral, supra note 51.
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In Landgon Winner’s phrase, “artifacts have politics.” LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE
AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY19 (University
of Chicago Press 1986).
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See, e.g., Pandey et al, Shuffling a Stacked Deck, supra note 64.
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Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 ACM TRANS. ON
COMPUTER SYS. 330, 332 (1996). See also Alejandro M. Diaz, Through the Google Goggles:
Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design (May 23, 2005) (unpublished B.A. thesis,
Stanford University), available at
http://epl.scu.edu/~stsvalues/readings/Diaz_thesis_final.pdf.
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all of the heavy lifting in the definition is done by the word “unfair.” But this
just kicks the problem down the road. One still must explain when
discrimination is “unfair” and when it is not. Friedman and Nissenbaum’s
discussion is enlightening, but does not by itself help us identify which practices
are abusive.76
The point that socio-technical systems have embedded biases also cuts against
search neutrality. We should not assume that if only the search engine could be
made properly neutral, the search results would be free of bias. Every search
result requires both a user to contribute a search query, and websites to
contribute the content to be ranked. Neither users nor websites are passive
participants; both can be wildly, profoundly biased.
On the website side, the web is anything but neutral.77 Websites compete
fiercely, and not always ethically, for readers.78 It doesn’t matter what the search
engine algorithm is; websites will try to game it. Search-engine optimization, or
SEO, is as much a fixture of the Internet as spam. Link farms,79 spam blog
comments, hacked websites—you name it, and they’ll try it, all in the name of
improving their search rankings. A fully invisible search engine, one that
introduced no new values or biases of its own, would merely replicate the
underlying biases of the web itself:80 heavily commercial, and subject to a truly
mindboggling quantity of spam. Raff says that search algorithms should be
“comprehensive.”81 But should users be subjected to a comprehensive
presentation of discount Canadian pharmaceutical sites?
On the user side, sometimes the bias is between the keyboard and the chair.
Fully de-biasing search results would also require de-biasing search queries—
and users’ ability to pick which results they click on. Take a search for “jew,”
for example. Google has been criticized both for returning anti-Semitic sites (to

76
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145–75 (Morgan Kaufmann Publishers 2007).
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Raff, Search, But You May Not Find, supra note 11.

THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET

447

American users) and for not returning such sites (to German users).82 The
inescapable issue is that Google has users who want to read anti-Semitic web
pages and users who don’t. One might call some of those users “biased,” but if
they are, it’s not Google’s fault.
Some bias is going to leak through as long as search engines help users find
what they want. And helping users find what they want is such a profound
social good that one should be skeptical of trying to inhibit it.83 Telling users
what they should see is a serious intrusion on personal autonomy, and thus
deeply inconsistent with the liberal argument for search neutrality. If you want
Google to steer users to websites with views that differ from their own,84 your
goal is not properly described as search neutrality. In effect, you have gone back
to asserting the objective correctness of search results: Certain sites are good for
users, like whole grains.

Traffic
The most common trope in the search debates is the website whose traffic
vanishes overnight when it disappears from Google’s search results.85 Because
so much traffic flows through Google, it holds websites over the flames of
website hell, ready at any instant to let them fall in the rankings. Chandler’s
proposed right to reach an audience and Foundem’s proposed “effective,
accessible, and transparent appeal process”86 attempt to protect websites from

82

See Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, supra note 63, at 943–45.

83

See James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 48 (2007).
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News); Chandler, Right to Reach an Audience, supra note 20, at 1110 (BMW Germany and
Ricoh Germany, main index); Michael Y. Park, Journalist Who Exposes U.N. Corruption
Disappears from Google, FOX NEWS, Feb. 18, 2008,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,331106,00.html (Inner City Press, Google
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being dropped. Dawn Nunzatio, for her part, would require search engines to
open their sponsored links to political candidates.87
A right to continued customer traffic would be a legal anomaly; offline
businesses enjoy no such right. Some Manhattanites who take the free IKEA
ferry to its store in Brooklyn eat at the nearby food trucks in the Red Hook Ball
Fields.88 The food truck owners would have no right to complain if IKEA
discontinued the ferry or moved its store. Search neutrality advocates, however,
would say that RedHookFoodTruck.com has a Jerome Barron-style free-speech
interest in having access to the search engine’s result pages, and thus has more
right to complain if the Google ferry no longer comes to its neighborhood.89
But, as we saw above, this is really an argument that users have a relevance interest
in seeing the site. If no one actually wants to visit RedHookFoodTruck.com,
then its owner shouldn’t be heard to complain about her poor search ranking.
When push comes to shove, search neutrality advocates recognize that websites
must plead their case in terms of users’ needs. Chandler’s modern right of
access is a “right to reach a willing audience,”90 which she describes as “the right
to be free of the imposition of discriminatory filters that the listener would not
otherwise have used.”91 Even Foundem’s Adam Raff presents his actual searchneutrality principle in user-protective terms: “search engines should have no
editorial policies other than that their results be comprehensive, impartial and
based solely on relevance.”92 Relevance is, of course, the touchstone of users’
interests, not websites’.
Indeed, looking at the rankings from a website’s perspective, rather than from
users’, can be counterproductive to free-speech values. If users really find other
websites more relevant, then making them visit RedHookFoodTruck.com
impinges on their autonomy and on their free speech interests as listeners. For
any given search query, there may be dozens, hundreds, thousands of
competing websites. The vast majority of them will thus have interests that
diverge from users’—and every incentive to override users’ wishes.
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Even when users are genuinely indifferent among various websites, some search
neutrality advocates think websites should be protected from “arbitrary” or
“unaccountable” ranking changes as a matter of fairness.93 We should call the
websites that currently sit at the top of search engine rankings by their proper
name—incumbents—and we should look as skeptically on their demands to
remain in power as we would on any other incumbent’s. The search engine that
ranks a site highly has conferred a benefit on it; turning that gratuitous benefit
into a permanent entitlement gets the ethics of the situation exactly backwards.
Indeed, giving highly-ranked websites what is in effect a property right in search
rankings runs counter to everything we know about how to hand out property
rights. Websites don’t create the rankings; search engines do. Similarly, search
engines are in a better position to manage rankings and prevent waste. And if
each individual search ranking came with a right to placement, every searchresults page would be an anti-commons in the making.94
Thus, it is irrelevant that Foundem had a prominent search placement on Google
before it landed in the doghouse. Just as the subjectivity of search means that
search engines will frequently disagree with each other, it also means that a
search engine will disagree with itself over time. From the outside looking in,
we have no basis to say whether the initial high ranking or the subsequent low
ranking made more sense. To give Foundem—and every other website
currently enjoying a good search ranking—the right to continue where it is
would lock in search results for all time, obliterating search-engine
experimentation and improvement.

Relevance
Given the importance of user autonomy to search-neutrality theory, relevance is
a natural choice for a neutrality principle. In Foundem’s words, search results
should be “based solely on relevance.”95 Chandler proposes a rule against
“discrimination that listeners would not have chosen.”96 Bracha and Pasquale
decry “search engines [that] highlight or suppress critical information” and
thereby “shape and constrain [users’] choices”—that is, hide information that
users would have found relevant.97
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See generally Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998)
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Relevance, however, is such an obvious good that its virtue verges on the
tautological. Search engines compete to give users relevant results; they exist at all
only because they do. Telling a search engine to be more relevant is like telling
a boxer to punch harder. Of course, sometimes boxers do throw fights, so it
isn’t out of the question that a search engine might underplay its hand. How,
though, could regulators tell? Regulators can’t declare a result “relevant”
without expressing a view as to why other possibilities are “irrelevant,” and that
is almost always going to be contested.
Here’s an example: Foundem. Recall that Foundem is a “vertical search site”
that specializes in consumer goods. Well, a great many vertical search sites are
worthless. (If you don’t believe me, please try using a few for a bit.) Like other
kinds of sites that simply roll up existing content and slap some of their own
ads on it—Wikipedia clones and local business directories also come to mind—
they superficially resemble legitimate sites that provide something of value to
users.98 But only superficially. The “penalties” that reduce vertical search sites’
Google ranks aren’t an attempt to reduce competition at the expense of
relevance; they’re an attempt to implement relevance.99 There are a few relatively
good, usable product-search sites, but most of them are junk and good riddance
to them. You’re welcome to disagree—search is subjective—but I’d rather have
the anti-vertical penalty in place than not. Those who would argue that
Google’s rankings don’t reflect relevance have a heavy burden of proof, in the
face of ample, easily verified evidence to the contrary.
In fact, behind almost every well-known story of search engine caprice, there is
a more persuasive relevance-enhancing counter-story.
For example,
SourceTool, another vertical search engine, has sued Google under antitrust law
for, in effect, demoting it in Google’s rankings for search ads.100 SourceTool,
though, is a “directory” with a taxonomic logic of dubious utility—the United
Nations Standard Products and Services Code—and almost no content of its
own. It’s the rare user indeed who will find SourceTool relevant. If you care
about relevance and user autonomy, you should applaud Google’s decision to
demote SourceTool.
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Self-Interest
In practice, even as search-neutrality advocates claim “relevance” as their goal,
they rely on proxies for it. The most common is self-interest. A Consumer
Watchdog report accuses Google of “an abandonment of [its] pledge to provide
neutral search capability” by “steering Internet searchers to its own services” to
“muscle its way into new markets.”101 Foundem alleges that Google demotes it
and other vertical search sites to fend off competition, and alleges that Google’s
links to itself give it “an unassailable competitive advantage.”102 Bracha and
Pasquale worry that search engines can change their rankings “in response to
positive or negative inducements from other parties.”103
Bad motive may lead to bad relevance, but it’s also a bad proxy for it. The first
problem is evidentiary. By definition, motivations are interior, personal.104 Of
course, the law has to guess at motives all the time, but the task is by its nature
harder than looking to extrinsic evidence. People get it wrong all the time. In
2009, an Amazon employee with a fat finger hit a wrong button and categorized
tens of thousands of gay-themed books as “adult.”105 An angry mob of
Netizens assumed the company had deliberately pulled the books from its
search engine out of anti-gay animus, and used the Twitter hashtag #amazonfail
to express their very public outrage.106 Amazon’s reclassification was a mistake
(a quickly corrected one), and a vivid demonstration of the power of search
algorithms—but not a case of bad motives.107
In all but the most blatant of cases, in fact, a search engine will be able to tell a
plausible relevance story about its ranking decisions.Proving that a relevance
story is pretextual will be extraordinarily difficult, in view of the complexity and
subjectivity of search. But it would also be disastrous to adopt the opposite
point of view and presume pretext. The absence of bad motive is a negative
that it will often be impossible for the search engine to prove. How can it
101
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establish, for example, that the engineer who added the anti-vertical penalty
didn’t have a lunchroom conversation with an executive who played up the
competition angle? This is not to say that serious cases of abuse are
implausible,108 just that investigation will be unusually hard and that false
positives will be dangerously frequent.
There is a nontrivial antitrust issue lurking here. In the United States, Google
has a dominant market share in both search and search advertising, and one
could argue that Google has started to leverage its position in anticompetitive
ways.109 Antitrust, however approaches such questions with a well-developed
analytical toolkit: relevant markets, market power, pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects, and so on.110 Antitrust rightly focuses on the effects of
business practices on consumers; search neutrality should not short-circuit that
consumer-centric analysis by overemphasizing the role of a search engine’s
motives. Some things can be good for Google and good for its users.
Thus, when Google links to its own products, not only can there be substantial
technical benefits from integration, but often Google is helping users by
pointing them to services that really are better than the competition. Consumer
Watchdog, for example, cries foul that Google “put its own [map] service atop
all others for generic address searches,”111 and that Google Maps has taken half
of the local search market at the expense of previously dominant MapQuest and
Yahoo! Maps.112 But perhaps MapQuest and Yahoo! Maps deserved to lose.
Google Maps was groundbreaking when launched, and years later, it remains
one of the best-implemented services on the Internet, with astonishingly clever
scripting, flexible route-finding, and a powerful application programming
interface (API).113
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One form of self-interest that may be well-enough defined to justify regulatory
scrutiny is the straightforward bribe: a payment from a website to change its
ranking, or a competitor’s. Search-engine critics argue that search engines
should disclose commercial relationships that bear on their ranking decisions.114
This is a standard, sensible policy response to the fear of stealth marketing.115
Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has specifically warned search
engines not to mix their organic and paid search results.116 More generally, the
FTC endorsement guidelines provide that endorsements must “reflect the
honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser”117 and that any
connections between endorser and seller that “might materially affect the weight
or credibility of the endorsement”118 must be fully disclosed. These policies
have a natural application to search engines. A search engine that factors
payments from sponsors into its ranking decisions is lying to its users unless it
discloses those relationships, and this sort of lie would trigger the FTC’s
jurisdiction.119 This isn’t a neutrality principle, or even unique to search; it’s just
a natural application of a well-established legal norm.

Transparency
Search-engine critics generally go further and argue that search engines should
also be required to disclose their algorithms in detail:
x

x

Introna and Nissenbaum: “As a first step we would demand full and
truthful disclosure of the underlying rules (or algorithms) governing
indexing, searching, and prioritizing, stated in a way that is meaningful
to the majority of web users.”120
Foundem: “Search Neutrality can be defined as the principle that
search engines should be open and transparent about their editorial
policies … .”121
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x

Pasquale: “[Dominant search engines] should submit to regulation that
bans stealth marketing and reliably verifies the absence of the practice.”122

These disclosures are meant to inform users about what they’re getting from a
search engine (Introna and Nissenbaum), to inform websites about the
standards they’re being judged by (Foundem),123 or to inform regulators about
what the search engine is actually doing (Pasquale).124
Algorithmic transparency is a delicate business. Full disclosure of the algorithm
itself runs up against critical interests of the search engine. A fully public
algorithm is one that the search engine’s competitors can copy wholesale.125
Worse, it is one that websites can use to create highly optimized search-engine
spam.126 Writing in 2000, long before the full extent of search-engine spam was
as clear as it is today, Introna and Nissenbaum thought that the “impact of
these unethical practices would be severely dampened if both seekers and those
wishing to be found were aware of the particular biases inherent in any given
search engine.”127 That underestimates the scale of the problem. Imagine
instead your inbox without a spam filter. You would doubtless be “aware of the
particular biases” of the people trying to sell you fancy watches and penis
pills—but that will do you little good if your inbox contains a thousand pieces
of spam for every email you want to read. That is what will happen to search
results if search algorithms are fully public; the spammers will win.
For this reason, search-neutrality advocates now acknowledge the danger of
SEO and thus propose only limited transparency.128 Pasquale suggests, for
example, that Google could respond to a question about its rankings with a list
of a few factors that principally affected a particular result.129 But search is
immensely complicated—so complicated that it may not be possible to boil a
ranking down to a simple explanation. When the law demands disclosure of
complex matters in simple terms, we get pro forma statements and boilerplate.
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Consumer credit disclosures and securities prospectuses have brought
important information into the open, but they haven’t done much to aid the
understanding of their average recipient.
Google’s algorithm depends on more than 200 different factors.130 Google
makes about 500 changes to it a year,131 based on ten times as many
experiments.132 One sixth of the hundreds of millions of queries the algorithm
handles daily are queries it has never seen before.133 The PageRank of any
webpage depends, in part, on every other page on the Internet.134 And even
with all the computational power Google can muster, a full PageRank
recomputation takes weeks.135 PageRank is, as algorithms go, elegantly
simple—but I certainly wouldn’t want to have the job of making Markov chains
and eigenvectors “meaningful to the majority of Web users.”136 In practice, any
simplified disclosure is likely to leave room for the search engine to bury plenty
of bodies.
Some scholars have suggested that concerns about transparency could be
handled through regulatory opacity: The search engine discloses its algorithm to
the government, which then keeps the details from the public.137 This is a
promising way of dealing with search engines’ operational needs for secrecy, but
it sharpens the question of regulators’ technical competence. If the record is
sealed, they won’t have third-party experts and interested amici to walk them
through novel technical issues. Everything will hinge on their own ability to
evaluate the implications of small details in search algorithms. The track record
of agencies and courts in dealing with other digital technologies does not
provide grounds for optimism on this score.138 Pasquale makes an important
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point that “it is essential that someone has the power to ‘look under the hood,’”139
but it is also important that algorithmic disclosure remain connected to a
workable theory of what regulators are looking for and what they would do if
they found it.

Manipulation
Perhaps the most interesting idea in the entire search neutrality debate is the
“manipulation” of search results. It’s a slippery term, and used inconsistently in
the search-engine debates—including by me.140 In the dictionary sense of
“process, organize, or operate on mentally or logically; to handle with mental or
intellectual skill,”141 all search results are manipulated and the more skillfully the
better. But in the dictionary sense of “manage, control, or influence in a subtle,
devious, or underhand manner,”142 it’s a bad thing indeed: no one likes to be
manipulated.143
In practice—although this is rarely made explicit—the concern is with what I
have described elsewhere as “hand manipulation.”144 This idea imagines the
search engine as having both an automatic, general-purpose ranking algorithm
and a human-created list of exceptions. Consumer Watchdog, for example,
derides Google’s claim to rank results “automatically by algorithms,” saying, “It
is hard to see how this can still be true, given the increasingly pronounced tilt
toward its own services in Google’s search results.”145 Foundem calls it
“manual intervention,” “special treatment,” and “manual bias,” and documents
how Google’s public statements have quietly backed away from claims that its
rankings are “objective” and “automatic.”146
Put this way, the distinction between objective algorithm and subjective
manipulation is incoherent. Both kinds of decisions come from the same
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source: the search engine’s programmers.147 Nor can the algorithm provide a
stable baseline against which to measure manipulation, since each
“manipulation” is a change to the algorithm itself. It’s not like Bing has rooms
full of employees looking over search results pages and making last-minute
tweaks before the pages are delivered to users.
Academics, being more careful with concepts, have focused on intentionality:
does the search engine intend the promotions and demotions that will result
from an algorithmic change? Mark Patterson, for example, refers to
“intentional manipulation of results.”148 Bracha and Pasquale sharpen this idea
to speak of “highly specific or local manipulations,” such as singling out
websites for special treatment.149 Chandler argues that “search engines should
not manipulate individual search results except to address instances of suspected
abuse.”150 Google itself is remarkably coy about whether and when it changes
rankings on an individual basis.151
Surprisingly, no one has explained why special-casing in and of itself is a
problem. One possibility is that it captures the distinction between individual
adjudication and general rulemaking: changes that only affect a few websites
trigger a kind of due process interest in individualized procedural protections.152
There is also a kind of Rawlsian argument153 here, that algorithmic decisions
should be made from behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing which websites
they will favor. For whatever reason, local manipulations make people nervous,
nervous enough that most of the stories told to instill fear of search engines
involve what is or looks like manipulation.154
Local manipulation, however, is a distraction. The real goal is relevance. From
that point of view, most local manipulations aren’t wrongful at all. Foundem
should know; it benefited from a local manipulation. The penalty that afflicted
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it for three years appears to have been a relatively general change to Google’s
algorithm, one designed to affect a great many low-value vertical search sites.155
When Foundem was promoted back to prominent search placement, that was
actually the manipulation, since it affected Foundem and Foundem alone.
Google thus “manipulated” its search results to exempt Foundem from what
would otherwise have been a generally applicable rule. To condemn
manipulation on the basis of its specificity is to say that Google acted more
rightfully when it demoted Foundem in 2006 than when it promoted it back in
2009.156
The point is that local manipulations, being quick and easy to implement, are
often a useful part of a search engine’s toolkit for delivering relevance. Searchengine-optimization is an endless game of loopholing. Regulators who attempt
to prohibit unfair manipulations will have to wade quite far into the swamp of
white-hat and black-hat SEO.157 Prohibiting local manipulation altogether
would keep the search engine from closing loopholes quickly and punishing the
loopholers—giving them a substantial leg up in the SEO wars. Search results
pages would fill up with spam, and users would be the real losers.

Conclusion
Search neutrality gets one thing very right: Search is about user autonomy. A
good search engine is more exquisitely sensitive to a user’s interests than any
other communications technology.158 Search helps her find whatever she wants,
whatever she needs to live a self-directed life. It turns passive media recipients
into active seekers and participants. If search did not exist, then for the sake of
human freedom it would be necessary to invent it. Search neutrality properly
seeks to make sure that search is living up to its liberating potential.
Having asked the right question—are structural forces thwarting search’s ability to
promote user autonomy?—search neutrality advocates give answers concerned with
protecting websites rather than users. With disturbing frequency, though,
websites are not users’ friends. Sometimes they are, but often, the websites
want visitors, and will be willing to do what it takes to grab them.
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If Flowers by Irene sells a bouquet for $30 that Bob’s Flowers sells for $50,
then Bob’s interest in being found is in direct conflict with users’ interest in
being directed to Irene. The last thing that Bob wants is for the search engine
to maximize relevance. Search-neutrality advocates fear that Bob will pay off
the search engine to point users at his site. But that’s not the only way the story
can play out. Bob could also engage in self-help SEO to try to boost his
ranking. In that case, the search engine may respond by demoting his site. And
if that happens, then Bob has another card to play: search-neutrality itself.
Regulators bearing search neutrality can inadvertently prevent search engines
from helping users find the websites they want. The typical model assumed by
search neutrality is of a website and a search engine corruptly conspiring to put
one over on users. But much, indeed most, of the time, the real alliance is
between search engines and users, together trying to sort through the clamor of
millions of websites’ sales pitches. Giving websites search-neutrality rights gives
them a powerful weapon in their wars with each other—one that need not be
wielded with users’ interests in mind.159 Search neutrality will be born with one
foot already in the grave of regulatory capture.
There is a profound irony at the heart of the liberal case for search neutrality.
Requiring search engines to behave “neutrally” will not produce the desired goal
of neutral search results. The web is a place where site owners compete fiercely,
sometimes viciously, for viewers and users turn to intermediaries to defend
them from the sometimes-abusive tactics of information providers. Taking the
search engine out of the equation leaves users vulnerable to precisely the sorts
of manipulation search neutrality aims to protect them from. Whether it ranks
sites by popularity, by personalization, or even by the idiosyncratic whims of its
operator, a search engine provides an alternative to the Hobbesian world of the
unmediated Internet, in which the richest voices are the loudest, and the
greatest authority on any subject is the spammer with the fastest server. Search
neutrality is cynical about the Internet—but perhaps not cynical enough.
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